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SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
Judicial interpretation of the causation requirement reflects an at-
tempt to forestall expansion of the proxy solicitation provisions to serve a
broader purpose than the preservation of the integrity of the shareholder
voting process. For purposes of transaction causation, the courts have lim-
ited the relevant transaction to which the proxy solicitation must be an
essential link to those transactions for which direct shareholder approval
is solicited.24 If proxy statement omissions or misstatements pertain di-
rectly to the shareholder voting decision, however, courts have tended to
find the causation requirement satisfied." ' In instances in which proxy
defects threaten the voting process, the concept of loss causation has not
barred proxy suits even when shareholders were not misled4 or where they
lacked the power to prevent a transaction. 7
Lower court application of the TSC and Mills tests has lent a degree
of certainty and clarification to the vague concepts of materiality and
causation. Proxy solicitors can look to their own perceptions of what is
important in judging what a reasonable shareholder may consider material
and are thus spared the dangers of retrospective evaluations of the reasona-
bleness of shareholder views.2 4 8 Clear delineation of what is material has
led to an expansion of the concept of causation and a concomitant decrease
in the difficulty of proving it.49 The decline of the importance of causation
thus renders materiality the primary factor in proxy solicitation suits.20
WILLIAM L. HALLAM
VI. TENDER OFFERS
Congress enacted the Williams Act' in response to the increasing use
of tender offers2 as a means of acquiring corporate control.3 The purpose
precluding obstructive measures by those shareholders, the corporate action would be made
possible by the dissemination of proxy statements. Thus, the proxy statement would be an
essential link in the accomplishment of the corporate action, id., so as to satisfy the Mills
test. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. at 385; see Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,
507 F.2d 374, 382-83 (2d Cir. 1974) (minority shareholders can protect interests better with
full disclosure; equity requires full protection for shareholders when they are most helpless).
I" See text accompanying notes 169-211 supra.
25 See text accompanying notes 212-43 supra.
2 See text accompanying notes 212-27 supra.
2 See text accompanying notes 228-43 supra.
21 See text accompanying notes 122-27 supra.
211 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. at 444 (broadening of causation in
Mills makes materiality more important); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. at 384-85
(strong showing of materiality makes stringent causation test unnecessary); Hewitt, supra
note 70, at 893 (materiality test varies with the degree of probability of impact of facts).
2" See text accompanying note 6 supra.
I Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 455 adding Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(c)-
(e), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (c)-(e), 78 n(d)-(f) (1976).
2 Although federal statutes do not define the term "tender offer," an accepted definition
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of the Act was to protect investors by providing for full and fair disclosure
by the parties to the takeover.4 The legislation requires tender offerors to
file a statement with the Securities Exchange Commission disclosing the
identity and background of the offeror, so that the shareholder can assess
its management abilities and prior treatment of acquired companies; the
source of funds to be used in the acquisition so that a shareholder can be
assured that adequate consideration exists; and, any plans or proposals for
mergers, acquisitions or other major changes in the target company's cor-
porate structure so that a shareholder will have an opportunity to evaluate
the company's prospects under new management. 5 However, the Williams
Act is basically a disclosure statute and does not explicitly provide for
private rights of enforcement or define key regulatory elements outside the
disclosure area. Consequently, courts have had to develop a body of sub-
stantive law for tender offer regulation.' In the past year courts enforcing
this body of law have examined the nature of relief available when a
statutory violation is found,7 the conflict between the Williams Act and
is that a tender offer is any general communication by a bidder to the shareholders of a
particular company which solicits them to present any portion of their shares in the company
to the bidder for his acceptance. Moylan, Exploring the Tender Offer Provisions of the
Federal Securities Laws, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 551,580 (1975); see E. ARANow & H. EINHORN,
TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 70 (1973) [hereinafter cited as TENDER OFFERS];
Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
86 HAiv. L. REV. 1250 (1973).
The tender offer is a relatively simple transaction and is thus attractive to those seeking
to acquire a controlling share of a corporation's stock. A potential buyer seeks a tar-
get-usually a company with a poor operating record or a company under-valued by the
market. See Note, Economic Realities of Cash Tender Offers, 20 MAINE L. REv. 237, 253-58
(1968). The offeror then attempts to acquire the degree of control it desires by offering to
purchase an ascertained number of shares from target company shareholders. Working con-
trol of a corporation often can be achieved by obtaining 20% to 30% of a target's outstanding
shares. Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints-An Interest Analysis, 21 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 613, 620 (1970). See generally Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try
A Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 991 (1973) [hereinafter cited as The Courts and the
Williams Act].
See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 2 [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD NEWS 2811.
1 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976). The Act applies to a person who acquires more than
five percent of a certain class of equity securities of a corporation. Yd. The 5% purchaser is
required to file a Schedule 13D report with the SEC. S.E.C. Rule 13d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.23d-
1 (1977). Section 14e, which was also added to the 1934 Exchange Act by the Williams Act,
requires disclosure of the information enumerated in § 13(d)(1) by any person launching a
tender offer which, if consummated, would raise his ownership above the same 5% triggering
level. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976). The disclosure of the required information must be
contained in a Schedule 14d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978); see Exchange Act Release No.
34-13787, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,256 (July 21, 1977). See
generally Comment, Section 13(d) and Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership, 119 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 853 (1971).
6 See generally Tender Offers, 1976-1977 Securities Law Developments, 34 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 861, 945 (1977); Tender Offers, 1975-1976 Securities Law Developments, 33 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 935, 969 (1976).
' See A&K Railroad Materials, Inc. v. Green Bay & W. R.R., 437 F. Supp. 636 (E.D.
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state takeover statutes,8 the procedural effects of statutes of limitation on
federal securities litigation' and the standing of defeated tender offers to
sue under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act."
A. Tender Offerors and the Right of Access to Target Company's
Shareholder List.
Section 14(e)" is a broad antifraud provision designed to protect the
investor shareholder in tender offer situations. A violation of this section
occurs when any individual makes an untrue statement of a material fact,
omits a material fact or engages in a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative
act in connection with a tender offer. This section of the Williams Act has
played a particularly important role in litigation involving an offeror's
right of access to a target company's shareholder list. Although offerors are
now able to obtain such lists under the applicable laws of most states 3 and
Wis. 1977) (production of shareholder lists not appropriate remedy for violation of § 16(e) of
the Williams Act) section A infra. But see Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec.
Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Aztec Oil & Gas Co., 406
F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
9 See Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (Idaho
corporate takeover statute preempted by the Williams Act) section B infra.
9 See Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1977) (statute of limitation begins to run
when fraudulent misrepresentation made) section C infra. See also Williams v. Sinclair, 529
F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1976); O'Connell v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 994 (5th
Cir. 1974); Briskin v. Ernst & Ernst, 398 F. Supp. 997 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
11 See Crane Co. v. American Standard Co., 439 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (defeated
tender offeror does not have standing to sue under the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts) section
C infra. See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (defeated tender offeror
does not have standing to sue under the Williams Act).
11 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Section 14(e) provides that
it shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made
, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts
or practices, in connection with any tender offer....
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
12 Id. The Second Circuit stated in Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480
F.2d 341, 362 (2d Cir. 1973), that the key concepts in analyzing a § 14(e) violation are the
materiality of the untrue statement and the culpability of the individual making the state-
ment. The full history of this Chris-Craft litigation is as follows: 303 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (preliminary injunction denied), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970)
(en banc), on remand, 337 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 480
F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973), on remand from 2d Cir., 384 F. Supp.
507 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 416 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 430 U.S.
1 (1977).
13 Many states grant shareholders the right to obtain lists of fellow shareholders. See
MASS. LAws ANN. Ch. 155 § 22 (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A'5-28, 14A:5-2 (1969 & Supp.
1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 624 (1963 & Supp. 1977). In addition, many states recognize a
common law right to inspect corporate books and records. See Texas Infra-red Radiant Co.
v. Erwin, 397 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1965); State v. Helen Shop, Inc., 211 Tenn.
107, 362 S.W.2d 787 (1962). Further, a few state takeover statutes specifically prohibit target
corporations from refusing to grant tender offers access to shareholder lists. See, e.g., IDAHO
CODE § 30-1505(3) (Supp. 1977); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.05 (3) (Supp. 1978). The takeover
19781
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courts dealing with the issue increasingly tend to grant access,' 4 disagree-
ment still exists over whether the refusal of a corporation to allow an offeror
to inspect the corporation's shareholder lists is a violation of section 14(e).
The Securities & Exchange Commission recognizes the problem and has
proposed that the refusal to provide a shareholder list to a tender offeror
should be prohibited as a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative practice
within the meaning of section 14(e).' 5 In A&K Railroad Materals v. Green
Bay & Western Railroad, 5 the most recent decision dealing with the access
question, however, a Wisconsin federal district court held that the refusal
of a corporate defendant to allow an offeror to inspect the corporation's
shareholder list was not a violation of the Williams Act.
The transactions leading to the A&K action began on October 22, 1974
when Burlington Northern, Inc. (BN) made a tender offer for outstanding
shares of the Green Bay & Western Railroad Company. Prior to making
the offer, BN reached an agreement with the directors of Green Bay wher-
ein the directors agreed to support the tender offer. As part of this agree-
ment, a copy of Green Bay's shareholder list was given to BNY The BN
offer did not receive the necessary approval of the Interstate Commerce
Commission until July 15, 1977.18 This approval was stayed to allow three
statute provisions are usually conditioned upon the offeror being a shareholder of record in
the target corporation.
" See Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Aztec Oil & Gas Co., 406 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Tex. 1976);
American Chain & Cable Co., Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox, Ltd., Civil No. B75-370 (D. Conn.
1976). See also TENDER OFFERS, supra note 2, at 12-18.
" See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34,12676 (Aug. 2, 1976), 2 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 24,295. The proposed Rule 14e-1 provides in part:
It shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice
within the meaning of Section 14(e) of the Act, for any subject company.., to fail
to furnish, upon the written request of any bidder planning to make a tender offer,
.... the most recent lists in the possession, . . . , of the subject company of the
names and addresses of the holders of record of such securities; .... within two
business days after receipt of such written request, provided that:
(a) the bidder has filed a Schedule 14D-1 pertaining to the tender offer...;
(b) the bidder undertakes in writing ... that such lists will be used exclu-
sively in connection with the tender offer... ;
(c) . . . the reasonable costs incurred by the subject company in furnishing
the lists will be promptly paid by the bidder; and
(d) the bidder undertakes in writing to mail, at its own expense, a copy of
the tender offer material to each person whose name appears on the list of stock-
holders....
Id.
" 437 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
i According to the testimony of Green Bay's president, Green Bay did not give any
updated shareholder list to BN, but provided address change information to the Kellogg-
Citizens National Bank, the depository for the tendered shares. At the date of the action,
approximately 85% of the outstanding shares had been tendered to BN. 437 F. Supp. at 641.
11 Since BN was a railroad company, the tender offer was subject to authorization by
the Interstate Commerce Commission. 437 F. Supp. at 640. 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (Supp. 1977),




railroads an opportunity to appeal the ICC order.
In mid-August 1977, the plaintiff, A&K Railroad Materials, announced
its offer to purchase fifty-one percent of Green Bay stock.'" On August 11,
Green Bay's president informed all shareholders of the status of the ICC
proceedings. At that time, the president stated that Green Bay's board of
directors opposed the A&K tender offer." Six days later A&K demanded
that Green Bay permit A&K to inspect Green Bay's shareholder list for the
purpose of informing Green Bay shareholders of A&K's offer. Green Bay
refused to permit this inspection. 2' The plaintiffs alleged that this refusal
was in violation of section 14(e). In addition, the plaintiffs charged that
the defendant made false and misleading statements to a local newspa-
per,21 that the defendant violated a fiduciary duty to its shareholders by
refusing A&K access to the shareholder lists,25 and that the defendant's
refusal to grant access interfered with A&K's prospective economic advan-
tage by reducing the prospects of success of the A&K tender offer.
24
Initially, the court determined that section 14(e) does not explicitly
grant tender offerors a right of access to a target company's shareholder
list.2 1 Furthermore, the defendant's mere refusal to allow inspection of the
lists was not a manipulative practice in violation of section 14(e) .26 The
plaintiff relied on the case of Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Aztec Oil and Gas
Co.2 as support for the argument that they had a right of access. In Mesa
Petroleum, the board of directors of the target company opposed a tender
offer and refused to provide shareholder lists to the offeror. The board then
advised the shareholders not to tender any shares until more information
,9 437 F. Supp. at 641. The A&K tender offer would cost $1.1 million and was to expire
on August 31, 1977.
" A letter sent by the president to target shareholders stating the target company's
opposition to the A&K offer is an initial defensive tactic employed by target companies. See
Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARv. Bus. REv. 135 (1967).
21 Many target companies refuse to make shareholder lists available to tender offerors,
obviously hoping to prevent or delay the offeror and various solicitor dealers from contacting
the shareholders and convincing them to tender their shares. See E. ARAow, H. EiNHORN &
G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 169-70 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS]. In contested tender offers in which
there is little arbitrage bidding in the market for the target's shares, the offerors may be
unable to succeed if they cannot contact the shareholders directly. Atkins, Shareholder Lists,
9 REV. OF Ssc. REG. 901, 901-03 (1976). The plaintiffs did have a copy of a Green Bay
shareholder list but the list was six years old. The president of the defendant corporation
testified that the list was about 95% accurate. 437 F. Supp. at 641.
22 See text accompanying notes 37-42 infra.
2 See text accompanying notes 43-48 infra.
21 See text accompanying notes 53-55 infra.
11 437 F. Supp. at 642; see TENDER OFFERS, supra note 2, at 14 (1973). Commentators were
surprised that neither Congress nor the Commission provided for the mailing of tender offers
to stockholders if the offeror does not have a shareholder list since the underlying purpose of
federal tender offer regulation is to insure that shareholders have full disclosure of all perti-
nent information concerning a tender offer. Id.
2" 437 F. Supp. at 642; Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Aztec Oil & Gas Co., 406 F. Supp. 910
(N.D. Tex. 1976).
1 406 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
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was available to them. The directors of the target corporation, however,
failed to mention that the tender offer was to expire in a week.2 The Mesa
Petroleum court found that the directors of the target company deliber-
ately misled its shareholders, and ordered the target company to provide
the shareholder list to the offeror. 29 The A&K court determined that the
plaintiffs' reliance on Mesa Petroleum was misplaced and that the case
was inapplicable to A&K's claim since Green Bay had not deliberately
misled the corporation shareholders."
The A&K court also reasoned that the timing of the competing tender
offers was crucial in determining whether it would be unfair to withold
access to shareholder lists. This reasoning can be seen in the A&K court's
determination that the case of Applied Digital Data Systems v. Milgo
Electronic Corp.31 did not support the plaintiffs' claims. In Milgo, two
competing tender offers were made within two days of each other. The
target company gave its shareholder list to the friendly offeror while with-
holding the list from a competing offeror.12 The Milgo court directed the
target company to give the list to the competing offeror.3 The Milgo court
based this decision on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Rondeau v. Mosi-
nee Paper Corp.,3 that all contestants in a tender offer situation should
have an equal opportunity to fairly present their case.3 Thus, when two
tender offers are made for the same target company stock, both offerors
should be given equal means of communicating with the target company
shareholders. The A&K court limited Milgo to instances where the two
tender offers were made at the same time and then reasoned that the BN
and Green Bay offers were not simultaneous. The BN offer was made
thirty-three months before the A&-K offer and eighty-five percent of Green
Bay shares were tendered to BN before the A&K offer was made." Appar-
m Id. at 911.
1 Id. at 917. The court ordered Aztec to either mail Mesa's offering materials to its
stockholders, or deliver to Mesa a list of such stockholders so that Mesa could mail such
materials at Mesa's expense. Id.
The offeror should have direct access to the shareholders list rather than having the
target company allow the offeror to submit material to the target for mailing. If the offeror
has direct access to the shareholder list, it can more efficiently use its time and resources by
selectively contacting holders of a large percentage of stock or those shareholders whom it
considers more likely to consider tendering their shares. See LETrER FROM SUBCOMMrrrEE ON
PROXY SOLICITATIONS AND TENDER OFFERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL REGULATIONS OF
SECURITIES, SECTIONS OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, To SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION Dec. 9, 1974, at 49-50.
11 The A&K court read Mesa too narrowly. The Mesa court sought to effectuate the policy
of the Williams Act by providing full disclosure of the tender offer to shareholders. 406 F.
Supp. at 917. Thus, the Mesa court was less concerned with factual situations and more
concerned with getting pertinent information to the shareholders. See text accompanying
notes 31-36 infra.
3' 425 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
31 Id. at 1164.
3 Id.
422 U.S. 49 (1975).
Id. at 58; see S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
38 437 F. Supp. at 643-44.
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ently, the A&K court determined that questions of fairness are not raised
when the grant of a list to one offeror does not favor that offeror over a
corporation whose tender offer comes at a much later date.
A&K further alleged that statements made by Green Bay's president
and published in a local newspaper were false and misleading in violation
of section 14(e). The president of Green Bay made three different state-
ments to the newspaper. First, he commented that A&K was not a reliable
and responsible organization in financial matters such as the tender offer
they were now attempting." Second, the president stated that since Green
Bay directors controlled more than 51% of the common stock, all of which
was committed to BN, A&K would not be successful in the tender offer."
Third, Green Bay's president postulated that stockholders who withdrew
their tendered securities would not only fail to complete a sale to A&K,
but could also jeopardize their position when the ICC gave final approval
to the BN offer. 9
The court held that none of these statements made by Green Bay's
president violated section 14(e). The statements were not materially mis-
leading to an investor, but were based on extensive business experience,
reliable financial reports and the existing factual situation. ° Nevertheless,
the A&K court reasoned that if any of the statements violated section
14(e), disclosure of Green Bay's shareholder list was not an appropriate
remedy." The court stated that Green Bay did not use the shareholder list
to make the challenged statements; rather the comments were made to a
local newspaper. Therefore, the plaintiffs could answer the president's
comments through the media and access to the shareholder lists was not
necessary.2
1 Id. at 643.
SId.
:'Id.
Id. The court found that Green Bay's president did not violate § 14(e) in making his
three published comments. A&K's net income had fallen off during recent years so that the
president's opinion on their financial reliability was not misleading. Id. at 642-43. Similarly,
the court determined that the president's comments as to the control of Green Bay stock
referred to voting control, not ownership of the stock. Id. at 643. Under this analysis, the court
reasoned that the statement was not sufficiently misleading to constitute a § 14(e) violation.
Finally, the president's statement regarding the applicability of the ICC action was based
on his belief that a binding contract existed between BN and the holders of the 85% of Green
Bay shares tendered to BN. Id. The president's belief was disputed at trial by the plaintiff
but the court merely found that the president's remarks did not violate § 14(e). Id.; cf.
Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (target company's statement
concerning offeror's previous failure to consummate offer not misleading when attendant facts
known to financial community); Emhart Corp. v. USM Corp., 403 F. Supp. 660 (D. Mass.
1975) (target company's statement that offer price is inadequate is misleading when not based
on public data).
" The only remedy available to the offeror would be some form of injunctive relief. The
Supreme Court's holding in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), forecloses
the possibility of A&K suing for damages as a defeated tender offeror. See DEVELOPMENMS IN
TENDER OFFERS, supra note 21, at 108-09.
42 437 F. Supp. at 644. The SEC has suggested that where a target company disseminates
misleading information to its shareholders, the court should direct the company to distribute
1978]
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The plaintiffs also claimed that they were entitled to Green Bay's lists
because the target's directors breached their duty to shareholders by fail-
ing to inform them of the A&K tender offer.43 Corporate officers owe a
fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders." However, the duty
does not extend to third parties, except a fiduciary duty owed to certain
types of creditors." A&K was not a Green Bay shareholder and not a Green
Bay creditor having a claim payable out of the defendant's present assets."
Thus, A&K could not claim the benefit of Green Bay's fiduciary responsi-
bilities. 7 The court found no evidence that the defendant's directors were
negligent in performing their duties by failing to inform shareholders of the
A&K offer.48
The court determined that the Williams Act policy precludes imposing
an affirmative obligation on the target company to provide access to share-
holder lists.49 The court reasoned that to require a target company to dis-
close and publicize a tender offer it opposes would disadvantage the target
company. Such a requirement would tip the balance in favor of the of-
feror-something Congress explicitly wished to avoid." The position taken
by the court, however, seems to ignore the primary purpose behind the
Williams Act, favoring full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors
while providing the parties to the offer an equal opportunity to fairly pre-
sent their case." The success or failure of a tender offer should turn on
the relative merits of the competing offers. By refusing one offeror access
to shareholder lists, target companies may prevent shareholders from
considering the merits of each offer and thereby frustrate the disclosure
correcting literature of its own, to distribute literature prepared by the tender offeror, or to
provide the tender offeror with a shareholder list so that the tender offeror may itself dissemi-
nate its literature. 425 F. Supp. at 1166 (letter from SEC General Counsel to Judge Weinfeld,
author of Milgo opinion).
11 437 F. Supp. at 644. The claim that A&K breached a fiduciary duty was alleged by
both A&K and the plaintiff stockholders of Green Bay.
" Id.; see Herald Co. v. Seawell, 427 F.2d 1081, 1094 (10th Cir. 1972).
' Corporate officers are not trustees for corporate creditors and owe creditors no fidu-
ciary duty, except when the corporation has insufficient assets to pay creditors' claims.
Swanson v. Tomlinson Lumber Mills, Inc., 307 Minn. 180, 239 N.W.2d 216, 220 (1976). A
corporate officer cannot take advantage of his position to secure an advantage or preference
for himself over creditors. Rankin v. Frebank Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 75, 121 Cal. Rptr. 348, 357
(1975); Kirk v. H.G.P. Corp., 208 Kan. 777, 494 P.2d 1087, 1090 (1972).
46 437 F. Supp. at 644.
'7 Id.; see Home Telephone Co. v. Darley, 355 F. Supp. 992 (N.D. Miss. 1973), affl'd, 489
F.2d 1403 (5th Cir. 1974); Phoenix Savings & Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 427
F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1970).
0 The A&K court's finding that the director had not breached a fiduciary duty is consis-
tent with Supreme Court analysis. In Santa Fe Indus., Inc., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977),
the Court indicated that Congress did not intend to create a federal cause of action for breach
of a fiduciary duty by corporate management. Id. at 478.
' But see text accompanying notes 71-72 infra.
437 F. Supp. at 644-45.
" See H.R. REP. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 4, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. N.ws 2811, 2813. See generally Porter & Hyland, Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Company
and the Williams Act Injunction, 59 M~aQ. L. R.v. 743 (1976).
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objectives of the Williams Act."
The court also dealt with A&K's claim that the defendant's action
interfered with the prospective economic advantage that A&K would have
gained with a successful tender offer. Under common law principles, inter-
ference with a prospective economic advantage gave rise to a cause of
action in the person injured when the means of interference adopted was
unlawful. 5 The A&K court found that neither the statements made by the
defendant nor the refusal to grant inspection of the corporation's share-
holder lists were unlawful acts under either federal or state law." Because
no unlawful conduct occurred, the common law action in tort was unavail-
able.1
5
The district court further considered whether Green Bay violated two
Wisconsin statutes regulating the rights of shareholders to inspect a corpo-
ration's stockholder list.6 First, the court held that the plaintiffs did not
meet the requirements of Wisconsin Statute section 190.14.11 Section
190.14 requires that the books, records and papers of railroad corporations
be kept and exhibited on request to any officer or director of the corpora-
tion or any committee appointed by shareholders owning ten percent of the
corporation's stock. 8 No plaintiff was an officer or director of the defen-
dant corporation. Moreover, the plaintiff shareholders did not purport to
be a committee appointed by the stockholders representing one-tenth of
all the prescribed stock. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff
shareholders had no enforceable right to demand an inspection and copy
of Green Bay's shareholder list."
Similarly, the court held that plaintiff shareholders were not entitled
to inspect the defendant's shareholder list under Wisconsin statute section
180.43(2).60 This provision allows a holder of at least five percent of a
'1 See DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 21, at 170.
u 437 F. Supp. at 645-46; see Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d
341, 360 (2d Cir. 1973); Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 537 P.2d 865, 122 Cal. Rptr.
745 (1975); Westhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1967). See generally Note, Recovery for
Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, 12 STAN. L. REV. 409 (1960).
" See text accompanying notes 31-59 supra.
345 F. Supp. at 646.
" The district court considered the state claims because they arose out of the same
common facts as the federal claims. 437 F. Supp. at 640. The district court's consideration
of these state claims was an exercise of the court's pendent jurisdiction. See United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1968).
51 Wis. STAT. § 190.14 (1977) provides in part:
The official custodian of the books, records and papers ... of every railroad
corporation shall keep the same ... ready to be exhibited to any officer, director
or any committee appointed by the stockholders, representing one-tenth of all the
subscribed stock, on request....
'Id.
437 F. Supp. at 645.
Wis. STAT. § 180.43(2) (1977) provides:
Any person who shall have been a shareholder of record for at least six months
immediately preceding his demand or who shall be the holder of record of at least
5% of all outstanding shares of a corporation, . . . , shall have the right to examine,
.... for any proper purpose, its relevant books and records of account....
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corporation's stock to demand or demand to see, for any proper purpose,
the corporation's books and records. 1 A proper purpose within the meaning
of the statute is defined as a reasonable purpose germane to a shareholder's
status as a shareholder.12 The A&K court held that the plaintiff sharehold-
ers' inspection demand was not for a proper purpose. The court based this
conclusion on its earlier decision in White v. Jacobsen Manufacturing Co. 3
In Jacobsen, the Wisconsin district court held that a shareholder's purpose
was improper where he sought access to shareholder records to secure a
merger involving the corporation and, as a stockholder, to secure a profit
on this merger. The Jacobsen court found that the shareholder was not
trying to protect other shareholders against any corporate mismanage-
ment, but was only seeking personal gain. 4
The A&K court improperly relied on its decision in Jacobsen as a justi-
fication for refusing to allow A&K access to the lists. The Jacobsen deter-
mination was clearly a result of plaintiffs seeking access to the list as a
means of furthering his interest as a stockbroker rather than a share-
holder. 5 In the tender offer area, however, courts generally have held that
a request for a stockholder list for the purpose of facilitating the purchase
of shares is a proper purpose.66 The rationale behind these decisions grant-
ing access is that when the corporation faces a situation having a potential
affect on its well-being or value, the shareholders are necessarily affected
in their capacity as shareholders. 7
The court's reasoning in A&K is contrary to the SEC's proposed rule
on access to shareholders lists. That rule expressly provides that any fail-
ure to furnish a tender offeror access to a target company's list is a violation
of section 14(e). 8 It thus becomes unnecessary to deal with the type of
timing and intent analysis entered into by the A&K court. Consequently,
adoption of the proposed rule would end conflict between courts and would
go far in furthering the "full disclosure" policies of the Williams Act.69
at Id.
12 State ex rel McClure v. Malleable Iron Range Co., 177 Wis. 582, 187 N.W. 646 (1922).
293 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
Id. at 1360.
Id.; see State ex ret Laird Inc. v. Jacobsen Mfg. Co., Case No. 68-564. (Circuit Court
of Racine County, Nov. 19, 1968) (purpose improper where shareholder seeks access to share-
holder records so he can secure profit as a stockbroker in a resulting merger).
U See, e.g., Weber v. Continental Motors Corp., 305 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); NVF
Co. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1091 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Crane Co. v. Anaconda Co.,
39 N.Y.2d 14, 346 N.E.2d 507, 382 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1976).
7 Crane Co. v. Anaconda Co., 39 N.Y.2d 14, 346 N.E.2d 507, 382 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1976);
cf. Credit Bureau Reports v. Credit Bureau of St. Paul, 290 A.2d 691 (Del. 1972) (shareholder
may properly request stockholder list to solicit proxies).
See note 15 supra.
The adoption of proposed Rule 14e-1 would not be an innovation in the field of federal
securities law. Insurgents in a proxy contest may be able to obtain the requisite information
regarding the target's shareholders pursuant to Rule 14a-7 of the 1934 Act. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-7 (1977). Rule 14a-7 requires target management to distribute the insurgents' solicita-
tion material or alternatively provide the insurgents with the names and addresses of all
stockholders of record together with a statement of the approximate number of beneficial
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Additionally, the decision in A&K effectively hampers the full disclo-
sure policies of the Williams Act: the grant of access to shareholder lists is
necessary. Any realistic appraisal of an offeror's prospects for success in the
tender offer requires a careful analysis of the ownership distribution of the
target company's equity securities prior to undertaking the offer. 0 Further-
more, a refusal to grant access to the lists prevents shareholders from
receiving pertinent information during a takeover contest and, therefore,
is contrary to the purposes behind the Williams Act.7 ' By providing the list
to each competing offeror, a court or state legislature can insure that the
success or failure of the offer will turn on the merits of the positions taken
by the offerors and the target.
72
B. The Williams Act and State Takeover Provisions:
Great Western United Corporation v. Kidwell
When the Williams Act became effective in 1968, only one state had
enacted legislation regulating the use of the tender offer as a means of
corporate acquisition.7 3 Since that time, however, twenty-nine other states
have passed take-over statutes.7 4 The proliferation of these statutes has
owners to be solicited through each bank, broker, or other person. Id. See generally E. ARANow
& H. EINHORN, PROXY CoNTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 40-58 (2d ed. 1968).
" See note 29 supra. In addition to enabling the offeror intelligently to evaluate its
chance for success, access to the stock ledger will provide the offeror with the address and
number of shares held by each stockholder, thereby facilitating both a direct mail and per-
sonal solicitation of tenders. TENDER OFFERS, supra note 2, at 12.
1, The Williams Act was designed solely to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit
of investors. 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams). Similarly, the Supreme
Court stated in Rondeau that the purpose of the Williams Act was to insure that public
shareholders who are confronted with a cash tender offer for their stock will not be required
to make a tendering decision without adequate information. 422 U.S. at 58.
7 See DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 21, at 170.
u See Virginia Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act, VA. CODE § 13.1-528 (1973).
T See Alaska Takeover Bid Disclosure Act, ch. 129, [1976] 1 BLUE SKY L. RP. (CCH)
6029 (to be codified in ALASKA STAT. § 45.57.010); Arkansas Corporation Takeover Act, ARK,
STAT. ANN. § 67-1264 (Supp. 1977); Colorado Investor Protection Act, COLO. REv. STAT. § 11-
51.5 (Supp. 1975); Connecticut Tender Offer Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-347 (West
Supp. 1977); Delaware Tender Offer Act, DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1976); GA. CODE §
22-1901 (1977); Hawaii Take-Over Bids Law, HAW. REV. STAT. § 417E (Supp. 1975); Idaho
Corporate Take-Over Law, IDAHO CODE § 30-1501 (Supp. 1976); Indiana Business Take-Over
Law, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3-1 (Bums Supp. 1976); Kansass Take-Over Bids Law, KAN.
STAT. § 17-1276 (1974); Kentucky Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act, KY. REV. STAT. § 292.560
(Supp. 1976); Louisiana Business Take-Over Offers Act, ch. 15, [1976] 1A BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 21,151 (to be codified in LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1500 (West)); Maryland Corporate
Take-Over Law, ch. 615, [1976] 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) T 23,421 (to be codified in MD.
COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 11-901); Massachusetts Regulation of Take-Over Bid in the Acquisi-
tion of Corporation Law, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 110C, § 1 (West Supp. 1976); Michigan
Take-Over Act, P.A. no. 179, [19761 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 25,341; Minnesota
Corporate Take-Over Law, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.01 (Supp. 1977); Mississippi Business
Takeover Law, MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-72-1 (Supp. 1977); Nevada Takeover Bid Disclosure
Law, NEV. REV. STAT. § 78-376 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421-A: 201 (1977); NEw JERSEY
CORPORATION TAKEOVER BID DISCLOSURE LAW (1977); New York Security Takeover Disclosure
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raised questions concerning the compatability of the Williams Act with
state regulations in the securities field. 5 In Great Western United Corp.
v. Kidwell,7" a federal district court considered the constitutionality of the
Idaho takeover statute in the face of charges that the statute was
preempted by federal law and that it placed an unconstitutional burden
on interstate commerce."
The case arose when Great Western, a corporation with its headquar-
ters in Texas,"8 announced its intention to make a tender offer for 2,900,000
shares of the Sunshine Mining Company,79 an Idaho based corporation. To
initiate the offer, Great Western filed a Schedule 13 D as required by the
Williams Act" and contacted state officials in Idaho, New York and Mary-
land to find out what it had to do to comply with the state takeover
provisions. Great Western evidently had concluded that Idaho would as-
sert jurisdiction under its state takeover statute, but that New York and
Maryland might be persuaded not to do so.8 In fact, Idaho's Department
of Finance ruled that Great Western must comply with its state statutory
provisions.2 Because of the uncertainty as to the effective date of the
Act, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1600 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77); Ohio Take-Over Bids-
Requirements, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.04.1 (Page Supp. 1973); Pennsylvania Takeover
Disclosure Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 71 (Purdon Supp. 1976); South Dakota Corporate
Take-Over Offers Law, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-32-1 (Supp. 1975); Tennessee Investor
Protection Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2101 (Supp. 1976); TEXAs ADMiN. GUiDELINES FOR
MINIMUM STANDARDS IN TENDER OFFERS 065.15.00.200(1) (1977); Utah Take-Over Disclosure
Act, S.B. No. 10 [1976] 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 47,331; Virginia Take-Over Bid
Disclosure Act, VA. CODE § 13.1-528 (1973); Wisconsin Corporate Take-Over Law, WiS. STAT.
§ 552.01 (1976).
"5 Senator Harrison Williams remarked that the increase of state takeover regulations
may serve to partially or totally frustrate the entire scheme of federal tender offer regulation.
See DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERs, supra note 21 at xix.
7' 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
7Id.
tA Great Western is a publicly owned corporation organized in Delaware. Id. at 423.
7' Sunshine Mining Company is a publicly owned corporation organized under the laws
of the State of Washington. Sunshine's corporate headquarters is located in Idaho. Id. The
2,000,000 shares Great Western sought to purchase represented 35% of Sunshine's outstand-
ing shares. Id. at 424.
90 Id.
11 439 F. Supp. at 424. Great Western had to notify Maryland, New York and Idaho since
the tender offer could not go forward in those states unless approved or the state chose not
to assert jurisdictions. See MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-902(a) (1975). N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 1602 (McKinney Supp. 1977); IDAHO CODE § 30-1503 (Supp. 1976).
" Great Western was advised by Idaho's Department of Finance that the disclosures
made by the corporation were inadequate and that the twenty day statutory time period for
a hearing would not start to run until a complete statement was received. 439 F. Supp. at
424; see IDAHO CODE §" 30-1503(5) (Supp. 1976). The Idaho corporate takeover statute re-
quires, among other things, lengthy disclosure by the offeror of the identity of all persons on
whose behalf the offer is made, the source and amount of funds to be used in the offer, the
purpose of the acquisition, and any material contracts, arrangements or understandings with
any persons with respect to any equity security of the target company. IDAHO CODE § 30-1502
(Supp. 1976). The statute further provides that:
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tender offer, Great Western filed suit in Texas district court against Idaho,
Maryland and New York for declaratory and injunctive relief that would
prohibit officials in the three states from enforcing their respective take-
over laws. s3
The Texas court initially considered whether proper venue existed in
its district. The court held that under section 27 of the '34 Act the plain-
tiffs action could be heard in Texas.84 Section 27 contains a broad venue
provision which allows an action to be brought in any district in which an
act constituting a violation of the federal securities laws has occurred or
in the district in which the defendant transacts business., The court rea-
soned that the acts giving rise to violation of the Idaho takeover statute
occurred wherever the statute was being enforced. 6 When the Idaho defen-
dants enforced the statute and stopped the tender offer to Texas sharehold-
ers of Sunshine, they committed acts in Texas which constituted a viola-
tion of the Williams Act and thereby subjected themselves to the claim
brought in a Texas court."
The Great Western court also held that to have standing to sue, Great
Western must first allege an injury in fact s and second, establish that the
(1) No offeror may make a takeover offer . . . which is not made to all ...
stockholders in [the] state .....
(5) No offeror may make a takeover offer involving a target company, ... , at any
time when an administrative or injunctive proceeding has been brought by the
director against the offeror for violation of this chapter that has not been fully
determined.
IDAHO CODE § 30-1506 (Supp. 1976). Also, the Idaho act does not require an offeror to comply
with the statutory provisions if the tender offer is accepted by the target company's board of
directors. IDAHO CODE § 30-1501 (Supp. 1976).
New York advised Great Western that it was leaning toward asserting jurisdiction. 439
F. Supp. at 424. Maryland, however, refused to comment on the applicability of its takeover
statute. Id.
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction in four areas: 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)
(general federal questions); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) (diversity); 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) (acts
regulating commerce); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934). The court
also found that it could properly assert personal jurisdiction over the Idaho defendants pur-
suant to §§ 1331, 1337 and 78aa. The defendants, to advance the interests of Idaho citizens
and/or Sunshine, a corporation with Idaho ties, had enjoined Great Western from purchasing
shares of Sunshine from citizens of every state, including at least 489 Texas residents. The
Great Western court therefore did not find it unfair to make the Idaho defendants appear
where the predictable consequences of their purposeful actions were felt. 439 F. Supp. at 433.
11 439 F. Supp. at 433-34. The court determined that venue in Texas was not proper
under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1970). The Idaho defendants did not reside within the Northern
District of Texas and thus venue could not rest on the residence of the defendants. The court
also determined that the claim did not arise in the Texas district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)
(1970) which allows a civil action to be brought in the judicial district where the claim arose.
The Great Western claim arose in Idaho, the state which asserted its power extraterritorially.
439 F. Supp. at 434.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
439 F. Supp. at 434. The court reasoned that the Idaho statute was being enforced in
any state in which Sunshine shareholders resided. Id.
a Id.
11 439 F. Supp. at 426; see California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972); Southern Pac. Co.
1978]
906 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
corporation was a proper proponent of the legal rights its sought to enforce
and possessed interests protected under the act. 9 The district court held
that to prove injury in fact Great Western had to show that a state in-
tended to enforce its statute to Great Western's detriment. Since the
Idaho Director of Finance had already entered an administrative order
delaying the date of Great Western's tender offer, Great Western had
suffered an injury in fact in Idaho.' The Court further stated that tender
offerors possess interests protected by the Williams Act, and that Great
Western thereby met the second standing requirement.2 The district court
concluded that this determination would further the congressional policy
of promoting even-handedness between management and the tender of-
feror in a takeover situation. 3
v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). The injury in fact requirement is necessary to render the
matter a case or controversy under the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. HI.
11 439 F. Supp. at 426; see Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970).
,0 439 F. Supp. at 426.
1' Great Western introduced evidence that delays under all of these state acts inflict an
economic cost on the offeror by tying up capital and significantly jeopardizing the success of
an offer. Id. The court also found that since New York officials had concluded that they had
jurisdiction over the proposed tender offer, standing existed in regard to New York. Id. at 427.
Prior to trial, however, the New York Attorney General's office informed Great Western that
Sunshine's assets were not enough to trigger the New York takeover statute. The district court
determined that this step rendered the action moot in regard to New York and the court
dismissed the case against New York. Id. at 429; see North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244
(1970). The court did express the view that the New York law would be challenged in the
future. 439 F. Supp. at 429. The court refused to find that Great Western had standing to
sue the Maryland officials due to the absence of any indication from those officials that they
intended to enforce the Maryland statute. Id. at 428.
92 Id. The court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), did not bar the Great Western action. In Chris-Craft, the
Supreme Court ruled that defeated tender offerors do not have standing to sue for damages
under the Williams Act. Id. at 42. Although Great Western was a defeated offeror, the Great
Western court reasoned that Chris-Craft was limited to suits for monetary damages and
should not be read to preclude a tender offeror's standing to sue for relief other than damages.
439 F. Supp. at 426. The Supreme Court in Chris-Craft pointed out that its holding was
limited to tender offerors suing for damages in their capacity as takeover bidders. 430 U.S.
at 42 n.23. The district court's finding that Great Western had standing to sue for injunctive
relief is consistent with recent commentary on the Chris-Craft decision. See DEVELOPMENTS
IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 21, at 105-17; Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 879 (1977).
13 439 F. Supp. at 426. The Williams Act draftsmen took great care to avoid "tipping
the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the
takeover bid." S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE: CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2813. See also Rondeau
v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Elec. Speciality Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969). The congressional attempt to balance competing interests
is also reflected in a statement by the chairman of the SEC in response to the suggestion that
the Williams Act would tend to aid entrenched management in defeating potentially benefi-
cial takeovers. The chairman stated that the SEC is "not concerned with assisting or hurting
either side. We are concerned with the investor who today is just a pawn in a form of industrial
warfare.... the investor is lost somewhere in the shuffle. This is our concern and our only
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The major substantive question considered by the court was whether
the Idaho takeover statute was preempted 4 by the Williams Act. Courts
generally find that state statutes are preempted by federal law if any one
of three standards apply. First, a state statute is preempted if it is appar-
ent that Congress intended to occupy the field and displace state regula-
tions." Second, a statute is preempted if the statute affects a field in which
the federal interest is so dominant as to preclude state laws regulating the
same subject." Third, a state statute is preempted if the statute conflicts
with the federal law to such an extent that it is an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of the federal scheme."
The Texas court looked to the coexistence of federal and state securities
laws over the past forty years and concluded that the Williams Act was
not intended to occupy the field of tender offer legislation. 8 Similarly, the
federal interest in the securities market is not so dominant as to preempt
state securities legislation.9 Thus, states have a valid interest in the regu-
lation of securities sold within their borders that has persisted for some
time in the face of federal legislation.'
The Great Western court did find, however, that the Idaho statute
conflicted with the Williams Act by interfering with the balance struck in
the Williams Act between the interests of the offeror and the management
of the target company. ' The court noted that the Idaho statute differed
significantly from the Williams Act in terms of requirements." The Idaho
statute required much more detailed disclosure information than the fed-
eral provisions."3 The Idaho act also required that a registration statement
be declared effective by a state official before the offer could commence. 4
concern." Hearings on S. 510 before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1967).
" Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, where states have
enacted laws covering the same field in which Congress has legislated, the federal law
preempts the state statute if the purpose Congress intended would be defeated by application
of the state law. U.S. CONST. art. VI[2]; see Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
(1945); Hines v. Davidowtiz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
15 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
" Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05 (1956).
9
7 Id.
439 F. Supp. at 435. The Supreme Court has held that states have the right to pass
regulations in the securities field. See L. Loss & E. CowEr, BLUE SKY LAw (1958)
[hereinafter cited as BLUE SKY LAw].
439 F. Supp. at 435.
'® See BLUE SKY LAW, supra, note 98.
,' 439 F. Supp. at 436; see note 93 supra.
,o 439 F. Supp. at 436.
' The Idaho statute required disclosure of the type of business done by the offeror and
its subsidiaries within the last three years and a description of the location and character of
the principal property of the offeror and its subsidiaries. IDAHO CODE § 30-1503 (Supp. 1976).
The Great Western court considered much of this additional information only "collaterally
related to that information that a shareholder would require in deciding whether or not to
tender his stock." 439 F. Supp. at 436.
10 IDAHo CODE § 30-1502 (Supp. 1976). State statutes require i statement to be filed with
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Further, the target company could demand a hearing on the matter before
any shares could be validly tendered to an offeror. Thus, target company
management could delay the institution of a tender offer for several
weeks. 10 Finally, while the Williams Act requires the offeror to file the
required information with the SEC under all circumstances, the Idaho act
does not require compliance with Idaho law if the target company's board
of directors recommended acceptance of the tender offer."' The court
found that this exemption from compliance with the Idaho statute indi-
cated an interest in management rather than the investing shareholder. 107
The court concluded that the effect of the Idaho takeover statute was
to prohibit tender offers to the detriment of offerors and the benefit of the
target company and its management. The Great Western court stated that
the purposes of the Williams Act and the Idaho statute conflicted. The
Williams Act regulates the making of tender offers to protect shareholders,
but the Idaho statute regulated tender offers to protect incumbent man-
agement. Because of this conflict, the court found that the Idaho takeover
statute was preempted by the Williams Act.'
The Texas court also considered whether the Idaho statute was uncon-
stitutional because the statute burdened interstate commerce, and tested
the Idaho act against the three criteria set forth by the Supreme Court in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 1o0 To be valid under Pike, a statute regulating
commerce must effectuate a legitimate local public interest and affect
interstate commerce only incidentally. If the first two tests are met, a
balancing test is applied to determine whether the burden imposed on
commerce is excessive in relation to the alleged local public benefits pro-
vided by the statute."'
the state securities commissions and the target companies before an offeror can begin acquir-
ing shares. Note, State Takeover Statutes Versus Congressional Intent: Preempting the
Maze, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 857, 868 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Preempting the Maze]. Even
the Delaware statute, one of the mildest of all state takeover statutes, requires notification
of the state securities commission and the target 20 days prior to the offer. DEL. CODE, tit. 8,
§ 203(a)(1) (Supp. 1976). The waiting period element may also be affected by the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1383, 1390
(1976), which requires that a cash tender offeror file 15-days notice of an offer with the FTC
before taking action.
'" The Great Western court stated that the Idaho statute, by giving the target company
management an absolute right to an administrative hearing prior to the time any tender offer
could be made, supplies management with a delay mechanism for use at the target's discre-
tion. 439 F. Supp. at 437. This hearing destroys the element of surprise which is so vital to
an effective tender offer. TENDER OFFERS, supra note 2, at 29. Properly executed, a cash tender
offer becomes effective before target management is able to formulate a defensive strategy.
Id.; see Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids-Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 115 (1967).
The practical effect of advance filing is to eliminate tender offers as a means of acquiring
control of a corporation. Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 MARQ. L. Rv. 687,
700 (1975).
,' IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(s)(e) (Supp. 1976).
10 439 F. Supp. at 437.
"I' Id.; see text accompanying notes 122-132 infra.
-01 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
"' Id. at 142.
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The Great Western court held that the Idaho statute was unconstitu-
tional since it did not effectuate a legitimate local interest and was not
local in application."' The court determined that the law was enacted
solely for the protection of local interests."1 The statute's purpose was to
thwart tender offers and thereby prevent possible removal of the target
company or target's management, the closing of plants, and related effects
on the state's economy."' Nor did the Idaho statute have only local appli-
cation. The statute provided that tender offers may not be made to non-
Idaho shareholders without being made to Idaho shareholders also.",
Therefore, the Idaho provisions affected the offeror's affairs in all states
within which the offeror might make a tender offer. Similarly, the Idaho
statute substantially affected interstate commerce since the takeover law
would preclude a corporation from making a tender offer anywhere until
the provisions of the Idaho act are met."5
The court completed its commerce clause analysis by applying a bal-
ancing test to the Idaho takeover statute."' The district court stated that
there may be some contingent benefit to shareholders under the Idaho
statute. The waiting period the act requires may cause the value of stock
to rise."7 Also, the management of the target company might make a
tender for shares of its own stock at a price in excess of the market value."'
Nevertheless, the Great Western court determined that the burden the
statute placed on commerce outweighed any benefits the statute provided.
The statute encouraged offerors to make lower offers than would have been
made without the statute."' The waiting and announcement period also
"' 43§ F. Supp. at 438.
"2 Id. Despite the State of Idaho's contention that the statute protects the interests of
shareholders, the Great Western court found that the immediate purpose of the statute was
to protect incumbent management. Id.; see Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S.
1 (1928) (practical effects of legislation, not legislative history, determine statute's purpose).
A state cannot legitimately regulate interstate commerce by asserting a local economic inter-
est. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
" 439 F. Supp. at 438.
"' IDAHO CODE § 30-1506 (Supp. 1976). The court found that the extraterritorial effect of
the Idaho act distinguishes the takeover statute from state Blue Sky laws which clearly are
not intended to govern regulation of securities outside state borders. 439 F. Supp. at 439; see
DEvELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 21, at 231; Preempting the Maze, supra note
104, at 859.
"' 439 F. Supp. at 439; see IDAHO CODE § 30-1506 (Supp. 1976).
"' The court did not have to apply the balancing test to reach a decision since the Idaho
statute had already failed the first two Pike criteria. 439 F. Supp. at 439; see text accompany-
ing note 109 supra.
" 439 F. Supp. at 439.
, Id. The court cautioned that benefits to the Idaho shareholders were not assured. If
management is satisfied with a tender offer, the Idaho statute never operates to delay the
offer. Id.
"I In some cases the offeror will hold the top offer back from shareholders and disclose
the top offer to target's management in hopes of obtaining management's approval of the
offer. Id. This practice hinders the shareholder investor because he does not receive the~full
disclosure contemplated by the drafters of the Williams Act. See generally Note, Commerce
Clause Limitations upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 So. CAL. L. REv. 1133 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Commerce Clause Limitation].
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had a disruptive effect on the target company's stock, perhaps to the
extent that there would be little market for the stock during waiting peri-
ods.' 0 Finally, the delaying tactics permitted by the Idaho statute may
discouragethe possibility of a tender offer ever being made.'"'
The Idaho statute preempted in Great Western is similar to other state
takeover provisions.'22 Therefore, the district court decision ultimately may
have an impact that goes far beyond the State of Idaho. Generally, the
state tender offer statutes interfere significantly with the successful com-
pletion of tender offers while only serving to benefit purely local interests.EI
The most significant impact of these statutes has been to provide the
management of target companies with substantial warning of pending of-
fers.' 24 The state statutes are designed to make it more difficult for the
tender offeror to prepare its offer in total secrecy and to give the target's
management ample time to respond to the offer.1 25 Both the advance notice
requirement and the minimum tender offer requirements increase the like-
lihood that an offer will be defeated or that a competing offer will be made,
I In discussing the problem of the waiting period, the New York Stock Exchange stated
that during the 10 to 20 day period within which the tender offer is filed and published, there
could be numerous counteroffers causing a great disruption of the market in that security.
New York Stock Exchange on Amend. Sub. S.B. No. 138, File No. 90 (Reg. Sess. 1969), May
9, 1969, reprinted in 1 SEc. REG. & L. REw. (B.N.A.) A-12 (1969). Such disruption could force
the Securities and Exchange Commission to halt trading in the security for that duration of
the waiting period. Id.
121 Id. at 439; see Fleischer, Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 9 REv. OF SEc. REG. 853,
857-58 (1976) (state tender offer statutes may cause shift to exchange offers and accumulation
of stock through market purchases and proxy fights).
'2 Idaho, like many other states, requires substantially more disclosure than that re-
quired in a Schedule 13D. See Preempting the Maze, supra note 104, at 870. In addition
several states reserve the right to request any additional information which may be required
by the attorney general. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1603(8) (McKinney Supp. 1977-78); OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.04.1(A)(1)(h) (Page Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2104(3)
(Supp. 1977). Similarly, of those states that regulate tender offers, all but Colorado, Dela-
ware, Maryland and Nevada have established specific administrative procedures by which a
tender offer may be delayed or prohibited. See DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note
21, at 216. Also, 23 states exempt tender offers from statutory coverage when the offer has
been initiated or approved by the target company's board of directors. See, e.g., MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch 110 C, § 1 (West Supp. 1977-78); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 552.01 (5)(e) (West 1977).
See generally DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 21, at 247 n.16.
'2 The justification of state tender offer statutes as measures to protect state residents
is contradicted by the nature of the statutes themselves. DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS,
supra note 21, at 230. None of the state statutes base jurisdiction over tender offers on the
residency of the offeree shareholders. Instead, they purport to protect all shareholders, regard-
less of their place of residency. See MINN. STAT. § 80B.01(9) (Supp. 1978). Thus, the argument
can be made that state takeover statutes are merely attempts to protect incumbent manage-
ment. See Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 119, at 1157-58; Subcommittee on Proxy
Solicitations and Tender Offers, Federal Regulations of Securities Committee, American Bar
Association, State Takeover Statutes and the Williams Act, 6, reprinted in 32 Bus. LAW. 187,
188 (1976) [hereinafter cited as State Takeover Statutes].
2I DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 21, at 217; see Wilner & Landy, The
Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1,
9-10 (1976) [hereinafter cited as The Tender Trap].
"I DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 21, at 219.
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forcing the offeror into a bidding war. The ultimate impact of state take-
over statutes may be to disrupt tender offers to such a degree that pro-
spective offerors may simply refrain from making such offers or may with-
drew offers that are contested, leaving the shareholders with no oppor-
tunity to obtain a premium for their shares.' 6
The overall effect of the state takeover statutes conflicts with the com-
prehensive scheme of existing federal legislation and renders the Williams
Act ineffective. The minimal disclosure requirements of the Act provide
shareholders with the information necessary to make an informed decision
regarding the sales of their equity interest in the target.' 7 In providing for
the disclosure, Congress drafted the bill without prejudice against use of
the tender offer as a means of achieving the transfer of corporate owner-
ship.'1 In contrast, the state statutory provisions allow a target company
to delay a tender offer without a showing of irreparable harm or even a
violation of a state statute. 2 The takeover provisions interfere with the
stated Congressional purpose of maintaining an equal balance between all
takeover contestants and significantly interfere with the mechanics of the
tender offer.' Consequently, either the Supreme Court'"' or Congress'
2
must act to reestablish the orderly development of federal securities laws.
C. The Aftermath of Chris-Craft
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., '3 the Supreme Court held that
a private cause of action' for damages does not exist on behalf of a tender
offeror under section 14(e) of the Williams Act. The Court based its analy-
2, Id. The potential for local tender offer statutes to disrupt national securities transac-
tions is further demonstrated by the passage of a tender offer statute by the town of Urbana,
N.Y., apparently for the purposes of protecting the Taylor Wine Co. See Carter, Blocking
Tender Offers With States Law, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1976, Sec. F. at 18, col. 3.
" The Tender Trap, supra note 124, at 26.
' Id. The chairman of the SEC testified that the Williams Act "is designed solely...
to fill the gap in the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to cover planned
acquisitions of large blocks of securities of publicly held companies, where control of the
company may be at stake. It is not intended to encourage or to discourage such activity or to
provide management or any other group with special privileges over any other." Hearings on
S. 510. Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1967).
I" DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 21, at 227. See text accompanying notes
124-126, supra.
'' See Preempting the Maze, supra note 104, at 891.
' ' The Supreme Court has acted previously to preempt state laws that interfere with
matters national in character. In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624
(1973), the court held that the enforcement of a local noise ordinance was inconsistent with
the pervasive scheme of federal regulation of aircraft traffic noise. Id. at 633. The need for a
uniform system of securities regulation would also justify preemption by the Supreme Court.
See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 143 (1851).
"I Congress could amend the Williams Act to expressly preempt state regulation of
tender offers. Such an amendment has been proposed by the ABA and the ALI Federal
Securities Code. See State Take-Over Statutes, supra note 123, at 192-194; A.L.I. FED. SEC.
CODE § 1603(c)(1) (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974).
' 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
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sis on the intent of Congress to use the disclosure requirements of the
Williams Act to protect shareholders faced with the decision whether to
tender their shares.'34 Since neither offerors nor target management were
intended beneficiaries of the Act, the Court suggested that these parties
pursue their rights in the state courts. 35 The effect of Chris-Craft on tender
offer litigation is demonstrated by two cases recently decided by New York
federal courts. In Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc. (Crane III), 136 the
court extended the Chris-Craft reasoning and held that a tender offeror
does not have standing to sue under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.' 31 In Stull v. Bayard, ,31 a case arising out of the same facts as
Chris-Craft, the court held that a class action by target company share-
holders was barred by the state statute of limitations.'35 These cases indi-
cate that, after Chris-Craft, tender offer litigation in federal courts will not
be an easy matter.
The Crane III decision arose out of a takeover attempt which the target
company resisted with a defensive merger. The initial offeror, Crane Com-
pany, approached the management of Westinghouse Air Brake proposing
a possible merger. Air Brake rejected the merger proposal and joined with
American Standard, Inc., a major competitor of Crane, to resist Crane's
takeover effort.'40 Air Brake's board of directors approved a merger with
American Standard' and in April sent out proxy statements seeking
'" Id. at 23, 27-41. The Chris-Craft court quoted extensively from remarks on the Senate
floor made by Senator Williams, testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, and the Senate Report. Id. at 26-31; see S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2811.
"1 430 U.S. at 41. To have standing under § 14(e) of the Williams Act the plaintiff must
be a member "of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted;" (emphasis in
original) there must have been a legislative intent to create the requested remedy; the remedy
must be consistent with the "underlying purposes of the legislative scheme;" the cause of
action should not be one "traditionally relegated to state law." Id. at 40-41; see Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
'1 439 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The Crane Co. action has had a protracted history
in the federal courts. See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) (Crane ); Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490
F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1973) (Crane II).
' 439 F. Supp. at 958; see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976)
[hereinafter referred to as the '34 Act].
' 561 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 769 (1978).
' ' Id. at 432-33.
"' 439 F.2d at 946-47. Crane Company was the beneficial owner of almost 10% of Air
Brake's outstanding stock at the time Air Brake refused the merger offer. After Air Brake's
refusal, Crane continued to accumulate Air Brake stock. Id. Shortly thereafter, Blyth & Co.,
investment bankers and representatives of American Standard, proposed a Standard-Air
Brake merger. The merger would consist of an exchange of Air Brake stock worth $36 per share
on the New York Stock Exchange for Standard securities worth $50 per share; id., see Recent
Developments, Tender Offers, 15 VILL. L. REv. 1002, 1002 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Recent
Developments].
"I On March 4, 1968, seven of the ten Air Brake directors met and agreed on the merger
of Air Brake and Standard. The next day Air Brake informed its shareholders of the agree-
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shareholder approval of the proposed merger.14 2 Crane then sued, charging
that the defendants had violated sections 9,143 10'" and 1411 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, Rules 10b-5 46 and 10b-6'47 and Regulation
14A."8 Crane alleged that both Air Brake management and Standard had
committed disclosure violations and manipulated stock prices to defeat
Crane's tender offer."' The district court dismissed Crane's complaint'50
and the Standard-Air Brake merger became effective two days later.
On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that the defendants had vio-
ment and Air Brake's approval thereof. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d
at 791.
"1 439 F. Supp. at 947. Crane mailed its offer to exchange Crane subordinated deben-
tures totaling $50 in face amount for each share of Air Brake stock, the offer to expire on April
19 at 5:00 PM. This mailing took place during the same week as Air Brake's proxy statement
was mailed. 419 F.2d at 791.
"I Section 9 of the Securities Exchange Act is a prohibition against the manipulation
of security prices. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1976). Crane claimed that the defendants had violated
§ 9(a)(2). This section makes it unlawful:
[tlo effect, alone or with one or more other persons, a series of transactions in any
security ... creating actual or apparent active trading in such security or raising
or depressing the price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase
or sale of such security by others.
15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1976).
"I Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act regulates the use of manipulative and
deceptive devices in connectipn with the purchase or sale of securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(1976).
"I Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act regulates proxy solicitations and tender
offers. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976).
,16 Rule lob-5 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
"I Rule 10b-6 is a prohibition against trading by persons interested in a stock distribu-
tion. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1977). The Rule prohibits issuers whose stock is in the process of
distribution from tampering with the market by purchasing either the stock or the rights to
purchase the stock until the distribution is completed. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1977). See
generally Rule lOb-6, 1977-1978 Securities Law Developments, 35 WASH. & LEE L. Rv.
(1978).
"' Regulation 14A, which was promulgated to implement § 14, lists requirements regu-
lating the solicitation of proxies. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 et seq. (1977).
' 439 F. Supp. at 947.
'' The district court's dismissal also covered an earlier complaint brought by Crane
claiming misrepresentations in the Air Brake proxy statement and asking for an injunction
against continued solicitation and use of the proxies. 439 F. Supp. at 947. The complaint
against proxy misrepresentations was dismissed for lack of evidence by the district court and
was not pressed by Crane Company in Crane I. 419 F.2d at 792 & n.8.
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lated Rule 10b-5 and section 9 by engaging in the manipulation of Air
Brake stock. 51 The court of appeals then remanded for remedial proceed-
ings. 52 On remand, the parties became involved in a procedural battle that
required another appeal to the Second Circuit.'53 The court of appeals
remanded the case again, but by this time the Supreme Court had an-
nounced its opinion in Chris-Craft. The district court maintained that
before the mandate from the court of appeals could be carried out, the
impact of Chris-Craft would have to be examined. 5' The court then de-
cided that Chris-Craft precluded Crane's suit. Although the Chris-Craft
analysis centered on section 14(e) of the Williams Act, the district court
extended the Chris-Craft reasoning to Rule 10b-5 as well as to the rest of
the antifraud provisions of the '34 Act because of the great similarity
between Rule 10b-5 and section 14(e).155
"' The Second Circuit held in Crane I that Standard Company violated § 9(a)(2) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by entering into a series of transactions for the purpose of
inducing Crane to sell its Air Brake stock. 419 F.2d at 974. Also, the court ' found that
Standard had violated Rule 10b-5 because Standard failed to disclose its manipulation, and
therefore deceived Crane in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Id. at 795-96.
The April 19 transaction involved Standard's purchase of 170,000 shares of Air Brake stock
on the NYSE at an average price of $49.50 per share. Standard then sold 100,000 shares "off
the market" to Investors Diversified Services and 20,000 shares on the market to Dillon Read
at an average price of $44.50 per share, thus apparently losing more than $500,000 for the
day. Id. at 791. These transactions by Standard raised the price of Air Brake stock to $50
per share, id. at 792, the same figure as the exchange amount set in Crane's tender offer. Id.
at 791. This resulted in a critical blow to the prospects of success for the Crane offer. Id. at
792.
152 419 F.2d at 803. The case was remanded to the district court for a further determina-
tion of the appropriate remedies to be afforded Crane. Id.
"I The parties in Crane I disputed the propriety of ordering a relitigation of all issues at
a jury trial. The district court ruled in Crane 1 that the jury trial on the merits in connection
with Crane's demand for equitable relief did not work a forfeiture of Standard's constitutional
right to a jury trial of any damage claim that might subsequently be asserted. Crane Co. v.
American Standard, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 766, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The court of appeals in
Crane II determined that the court's decision in Crane I could not be challenged in the fraud
action and precluded relitigation of all issues resolved in Crane I. 490 F.2d at 342-43. The
Crane ! court further held that a district court judge was fully capable of fashioning monetary
relief and that the Supreme Court's decisions in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469
(1962), and Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), did not entitle Standard
to a jury trial on the damages issue. 490 F.2d at 344.
"1' 439 F. Supp. at 949. The district court in Crane III reasoned that a lower court is not
bound by the mandate of the court of appeals if the Supreme Court has subsequently changed
or clarified the relevant law. Id; see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 178 (2d
Cir. 1967), cert. deneid, 390 U.S. 956 (1968); Page v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 349 F.2d
820, 821 (5th Cir. 1965).
"I In Electronic Speciality Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969), the Second Circuit noted that § 14(e) "largely tracks the substantive provisions of Rule
10b-5." Id. at 945. Prior to the enactment of the Williams Act, claimants sued under Rule
10b-5 when fraud was alleged in connection with a tender offer. See, e.g., Mutual Shares
Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1967); Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser
Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840, 842 (2d Cir. 1967); Moore v. Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490,
491 (N.D. Ohio 1967). See also Lank v. New York Stock Exchange, 548 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1977)
('34 Act, like Williams Act, was enacted to benefit public investors).
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The court exhaustively examined Chris-Craft and its applicability to
the Crane facts. Crane Company, like Chris-Craft Industries, was not enti-
tled to protection since Crane was not a member of the class the statute
was designed to protect.'6 The Chris-Craft Court had carefully distin-
guished the position of the target shareholder from that of the tender
offeror. While target shareholders can allege a need for the disclosure re-
quired under the Williams Act, tender offerors cannot claim the same
need. Moreover, the Supreme Court had found that the damages sustained
by Chris-Craft were the result of its activities as a contestant for control.'57
Similarly, Crane's damages were the result of its activities as a takeover
contestant. Thus, Crane was not in the position of a target shareholder
faced with a decision to tender or hold shares of stock.' 8
The Crane III court also applied Chris-Craft in resolving Crane's sec-
tion 9 and Rule 10b-6 claims. Both the Chris-Craft court and the Crane
III court noted the similarity between section 9 and Rule 10b-6. Specifi-
cally, section 9(a)(2) makes it unlawful for a person to trade in a security
for the purpose of inducing the sale or purchase of that security by others.'"
Similarly, Rule 10b-6 prohibits issuers of stock in the process of distribu-
tion from tampering with the market by purchasing either that stock or
rights to purchase the stock until the distribution is completed.'60 The
Supreme Court in Chris-Craft, while agreeing that section 9 provides an
express cause of action for persons injured by unlawful market activity,
held that section 9 protects only persons who sell or purchase a security at
a price affected by an unlawful act or transaction.'6 ' The Court further
concluded that Rule 10b-6 promotes the existence of an orderly market free
from artificial or manipulative influences. The Rule protects investors in-
jured by market manipulation during distributions.' Crane, like Chris-
Craft, did not sue as an investor who had paid too much for manipulated
stock. Rather, the gravamen of Crane's complaint was that the company
had lost the opportunity to control Air Brake.'63 Consequently, the claim
was not within the specific concerns of section 9 and Rule 10b-6 and Crane
did not have standing under the antimanipulative provisions of the '34
Act.'64
The district court determined that its finding that Crane did not have
standing was consistent with other recent Supreme Court decisions con-
cerning the standing of individuals to sue under the federal securities
laws. '65 The Crane court noted that the Supreme Court is taking a hard,
" 439 F. Supp. at 952-53.
430 U.S. at 35-36.
439 F. Supp. at 952.
'" See note 143 supra.
'5' See 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-6 (1977).
430 U.S. at 46.
' Id. at 45.
'" 439 F. Supp. at 953. See generally, Note, Chris-Craft And Loss Of Opportunity To
Control: The Lost Opportunity, 43 FoRDHAm L. Rsv. 820 (1975).
"1' 439 F. Supp. at 953.
'ts Id.
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restrictive look at federal jurisdiction in the securities field.'" Particularly
relevant to the Crane action was the Supreme Court's decision in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 7 which reaffirmed that only an actual
purchaser or seller of securities can maintain a private right of action for
damages under section 10(b) of the '34 Act of SEC Rule 10b-5.'" Strict
application of this rule precluded suit by Crane because it had neither
purchased nor sold Air Brake stock in reliance on Standard's manipulative
conduct.'" Moreover, the Crane III court concluded that even if Crane had
Recently, the Supreme Court has altered fundamentally the scope of coverage and
protection that the federal securities laws offer to the investing public. The Supreme Court
has held in favor of the defendants in these decisions and has enumerated principles that
circumscribe the rights of plaintiffs under the federal securities laws. See TSC Indus., Inc.
v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (failure to disclose fact in proxy solicitation material
only if substantial likelihood that reasonable shareholders would deem fact important); Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (liability under Rule 10b-5 requires allegation of
intent ot deceive, manipulate or defraud); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975) (plaintiff must be actual purchaser or seller of securities to have standing under
Rule 10b-5). See generally Castruccio, Developments in Federal Securities Regula-
tions-1976, 32 Bus. LAW 1537 (1977); Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the
Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891 (1977).
,6 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
Id. at 749. The Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps clarified the Rule 10b-5
purchaser-seller requirement by supporting the Birnbaum doctrine. Id. This doctrine was
established by the Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.
1952), where the court held that Rule 1Ob-5 extends protection only to actual purchasers or
sellers of a security. Id. at 464. The Blue Chip court reiterated that three classes of potential
plaintiffs were barred by Birnbaum. First are potential purchasers of shares "who allege that
they decided not to purchase because of an unduly gloomy representation or the omission of
favorable material .. " Second are shareholders "who allege that they decided not to sell
their shares because of an unduly rosy representation or a failure to disclose unfavorable
material. Third are shareholders ... who suffered loss in the value of their investment due
to corporate or insider activities in connection with the purchase or sale of securities which
violate Rule 10b-5." 421 U.S. at 737-38.
" The Crane III district court reasoned that the purchaser-seller requirement barred
Crane's recovery in two ways. First, the Air Brake shareholders were the primary victims of
Standard's manipulation and were the hoodwinked investors. 439 F. Supp. at 955. An ordi-
nary investor, upon examining the April 19 stock figures, could conclude that there was a
great demand for Air Brake stock and that a tender of stock to Crane would be unprofitable
at that time. In fact, the Crane I court reasoned that Standard's action on April 19 created a
prima facie case of manipulative purpose. 419 F.2d at 795; see 3 L. Loss, SEcuRmEs
REGULATION 1552-53 (2d Ed. 1961). Yet, the Air Brake shareholders fell into the second class
of potential plaintiffs precluded from suing under Birnbaum since they were actual share-
holders of the issuer who decided not to sell because of an unduly rose representation. 439 F.
Supp. at 955. Second, the district court compared Crane to the third class of potential
plaintiffs barred by Birnbaum. Id. The court held that Crane invested in Air Brake to obtain
control. The value of the investment substantially diminished when the Crane takeover effort
failed. Id. The Crane I court originally had found on the basis of a forced seller analysis that
Crane had standing to sue. The court concluded that Standard's actions forced Crane to
become a seller within the meaning of § 9(a)(2). 419 F.2d at 794; see note 11 supra. If
successful in defeating Crane's tender offer and consummating the Standard merger, anti-
trust considerations would have required that Crane sell the shares it already held or shares
received in exchange. Id.; see Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1968). The Crane I decision might toll the death knell of the
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standing to sue, the suit should be dismissed because Crane had failed to
prove that the defeat of its tender offer was caused by the manipulative
practices of Air Brake and Standard.
70
In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Chris-Craft and the Second
Circuit's decision in Crane III, there is little opportunity for tender offerors
to seek damages under the Williams Act in federal courts. Now the prelimi-
nary injunction ranks as the principal, and, perhaps, sole means of relief
for a tender offeror confronted with fraudulent practices. However, the
availability of injunctive relief 7' should not be viewed as a justification for
restricting the standing of tender offerors under federal securities laws.
Although the injunction is the usual form of relief in the tender offer
context, 7 1 it should not be considered an exclusive remedy." 3 The Chris-
Birnbaum doctrine by extending protection to plaintiffs who were not purchasers or sellers
engaged in a securities transaction. See Note, Antifraud Provisions Applied to Tender Offers,
45 TuL. L. Rav. 188, 195 (1970); Recent Developments, supra note 140, at 1015-16.
"7o The district court reasoned that Crane presented significant problems of proof of
causation and damages. Crane could recover only upon proof that Air Brake shareholders who
did not tender would have tendered but for Standard's acts and that this failure to tender
damaged Crane. 439 F. Supp. at 955. Crane argued that it was entitled to a presumption of
causation, reasoning that the number of shares it would have acquired but for Standard's
manipulation was a "classic imponderable," rendered uncertain by Standard's own actions.
Id. at 956 n.4. Crane sought relief under the Supreme Court language in Bigelow v. RKO
Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S, 251 (1946), where the Court stated that "[tihe most elemen-
tary conceptions of justice. . .require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty
which his own wrong had created." Id. at 265. However, the Crane III court agreed with
Standard that Crane had failed to prove its causation claim. The court stressed that under
the terms of the Crane offer, most tendering decisions by Air Brake shareholders had to be
made prior to April 19. 439 F. Supp. at 957. Air Brake's opposition to Crane's offer undoubt-
edly influenced the inaction of Air Brake's stockholders. See Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of
Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARv. Bus. REv. 135, 139 (1967). Furthermore, Standard's merger
proposal was more attractive to Air Brake shareholders than Crane's offer. Crane's offer
involved subordinated debentures, while the Standard merger proposal involved preferred
stock. 439 F. Supp. at 957. Furthermore, evidence at trial indicated that shareholders tender-
ing to Crane would possibly suffer capital gains taxes. Id.
The judicial search for an objective standard for determining causation is reflected in
the Supreme Court's decision in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970);
see Halle & Stieglitz v. Empress Int'l Ltd., 430 SEC. RE. & L. REP. (BNA) A-7, A-9 (D. Del.
Nov. 2, 1977) (to establish cause of action under § 14(e), claimant must demonstrate causal
connection between alleged wrongdoing of defendant and injuries suffered by plaintiff).
"I The Chris-Craft Court stated that injunctive relief rather than a damages award is a
suitable remedy for defeated tender offerors. 430 U.S. at 42. The Court suggested that a
damages award might be inconsistent with the interests of many members of the protected
class and of little value to shareholders who accepted the exchange offer of the defeated
takeover contestant. Id. Similarly, the Crane III court referred to injunctive relief as the best
recourse for contestants in a takeover battle. 439 F. Supp. at 952.
11 See Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assoc., 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973);
Butler Aviation Int'l., Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970),
aff'g, 307 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Electronic Speciality Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969); Metro-Goldwin Mayer v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F.
Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try a Little
Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 991, 1007-11 (1973).
'3 One form of injunctive relief often requested by claimants is the disenfranchisement
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Craft Court indicated that whatever deterrent value is inherent in litiga-
tion by the defeated tender offeror will not be diminished if plaintiffs are
entitled to injunctive relief.'74 Nevertheless, the availability of such relief
is likely to be limited.
Courts in previous securities cases have interpreted strictly the tradi-
tional view that an injunction may be granted only if a plaintiff is likely
to be irreparably harmed.'75 Irreparably harmful violations of section 14(e)
or Rule 10b-5 may be difficult to detect at preliminary phases of the take-
over contest, and delay increases the likelihood that a violator will adopt
defensive tactics of a complex nature.'76 Finally, courts are generally very
reluctant to use their equitable powers at later stages of business transac-
tions because the rights of innocent third parties are involved.'77 Since
injunctive relief is useful only at the early stages of a takeover contest'78
and since Chris-Craft and Crane abolish the offeror's private action for
damages, the tender offeror is now afforded little protection when con-
fronted with fraudulent practices in connection with a tender offer.'
7
The investing shareholder, the class protected by the Williams Act, also
may find it difficult to bring an action in federal court after Chris-Craft.
The Second Circuit in Stull v. Bayard' ° points out that the practical
limitations a private shareholder has in uncovering corporate fraud, to-
gether with short state statutes of limitation, causes problems for private
of security voting rights acquired in violation of the disclosure statutes. See, e.g., Twin Fair,
Inc. v. Reger, 529 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1976); Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J.
1974); Water & Wall Assoc., Inc. v. American Index, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,943 (D.N.J. 1973). See also General Aircraft v. Lampert, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED SEC. L. REP. 96,068 (1st Cir. 1977) (court refused to enjoin voting of
securities, but enjoined solicitation of group until members filed 13D statement disclosing
existence of group).
,"I See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, Securities Regulation, 91 HARv. L. REv. 70, 280
(1977).
"I See, e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Chris-Craft Indus. v.
Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 573 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 430
U.S. 1 (1977).
'7' See generally TENDER OFFERS, supra note 2, at 219-76.
," See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434-35 (1964); H.K. Porter Co. v.
Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973).
"I In Chris-Craft, the Supreme Court referred with approval to an observation in Elec-
tronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969) that "in
corporate control contests the stage of preliminary injunctive relief, rather than post-contest
lawsuits, is the time when relief can best be given." 430 U.S. at 42, quoting, Electronic
Speciality Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d at 947.
,"I Injunctive relief was not a suitable remedy in Crane. In Crane, the alleged violations
by the target company took place on April 19, the last day of the Crane tender offer. 419 F.2d
at 792, Thus, the Crane Company could not have sought injunctive relief at the earliest stages
of the tender offer battle and an injunction sought after April 19 would have come too late to
save the Crane offer. Similarly, the Chris-Craft court, while categorizing injunctions as the
principal contestant relief, indicated that an injunction in Chris-Craft was inappropriate
because the contest for control had ended four years prior to the Supreme Court hearing the
case. 430 U.S. at 48.
'" 561 F.2d at 429 (2d Cir. 1977).
[Vol. XXXV
SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
shareholders suing under the Williams Act. Section 14(e) '8' of the Williams
Act does not provide a period of limitations for actions brought thereun-
der.12 Therefore, federal courts, when considering a limitations problem,
must apply the forum state's statute of limitations that effectuates the
underlying policy of the federal statute.' Courts usually adopt the state
statute of limitations for actions based on common law fraud.'84 While
state law provides the limitation period, federal law determines when the
period begins to run.'" Under federal law, statutes of limitation begin to
run when the plaintiff has actual knowledge of the alleged fraud or knowl-
edge of facts which in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have led
to actual knowledge.'86
In Stull, the suit arose of the battle for control of Piper Aircraft Corpo-
ration that took place between Bangor Punta Corporation and Chris-Craft
" ' 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Section 14(e) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material or
omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or to
engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connec-
tion with any tender offer....
Section 14(e) is modeled along the lines of SEC Rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977); see
Note, Chris-Craft: The Uncertain Evolution of Section 14(e), 76 COLUM. L. REV. 634, 635
(1976).
112 Neither of the major federal securities fraud provisions, 14(e) or 10b-5, contains a
statute of limitations. See Bateman & Keith, Statutes of Limitation Applicable to Private
Actions Under SEC Rule I0b-5, Complexity in Need of Reform, 39 Mo. L. REv. 165, 166
(1974); Martin, Statutes of Limitation in 10b-5 Actions: Which Statute Is Applicable? 29 Bus.
LAW. 443, 446-47 (1974). But see Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule
10b-5, 1972 DuKE L.J. 1125, 1149-50 (federal statute of limitations contained in Securities
Exchange Act for civil violation should also be limitation period for fraudulent violations).
"1 Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 780 (2d Cir. 1977); United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481
F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973); de Haas v. Empire Petroleum
Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 1970). In choosing the state statute, federal courts look to
the underlying philosophy, remedial nature, and broad construction of the federal provision.
Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967). The Eighth Circuit stated that in determin-
ing the applicable statute of limitations, courts should look to the "local statute which bears
the closest resemblance to the federal statute involved." Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d
1233, 1237-38 (8th Cir. 1970); accord, Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974).
Kramer v. Loewi & Co., 357 F. Supp. 83 (E.D. Wis. 1973). See generally Jacobs, Affirmative
Defenses to Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 Actions, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 864-70
(1976).
1" 561 F.2d at 431; see, e.g., Williams v. Sinclair, 529 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1975); Klien v.
Auchincloss, Parker & Redpath, 436 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1971); Briskin v. Ernst & Ernst, 398
F. Supp. 997 (C.D. Cal. 1975). Federal courts have adopted state blue sky statute of limita-
tions. See, e.g., O'Connell v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1974);
Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972). One court chose to use the
statute of limitations for a personal action in trespass. See Tober v. Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D.
74 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
" 561 F.2d at 432; see Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1975); Long v. Abbot
Mortgage Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Conn. 1976).
" Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1975); Azalen Meats,
Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 8-9 (5th Cir. 1967).
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Industries.' s7 The plaintiff, a Piper shareholder, sued Piper Corporation,
Bangor Punta Corporation and First Boston Corporation, alleging that he
and the members of a putative class of shareholders were induced not to
exchange their Piper shares for stock in Chris-Craft because of fraudulent
misstatements by the defendants.' 8 To induce Piper shareholders to sur-
render their stock, Chris-Craft made several cash tender and stock ex-
change offers, the last of which expired on August 4, 1969.189 On July 18,
1969, Bangor Punta filed a prospectus and made a competing exchange
offer.'90 Plaintiffs commenced their suit on August 1, 1978, claiming that
the overevaluation of an asset in the July 18 Bangor Punta prospectus was
a fraudulent misstatement."9 ' The district court granted defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's suit was
barred by the statute of limitations. The Second Circuit affirmed.'92
The district court found that the New York fraud statute was most
closely analogous to the federal rule. This statute presents alternative
limitation periods in the case of delayed discovery of a fraudulent practice.
The time periods were two years from discovery of the alleged fraudulent
violation or six years from the time the cause of action accrued, whichever
was longer.'93 The two year period was clearly inapplicable since the plain-
tiff had actual knowledge of the section 14(e) violations no later than May
10, 1971.' 94 The six year period, on the other hand, began on the date when
a plaintiff with assumed knowledge could assert a claim for relief.'9' The
plaintiff claimed that this date was August 4, 1969, the day the final Chris-
' The Stull suit was initiated after the Supreme Court decided Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
11- 561 F.2d at 431.
't Id.
190 Id.
M' The registration materials that Bangor filed with the SEC in connection with its
exchange offer included financial statements, reviewed by First Boston, representing that one
of Bangor's subsidiaries, the Bangor & Aroostock Railroad (BAR), had a value of $18.4
million. This valuation was based on a 1965 appraisal by investment bankers after a proposed
sale of the BAR failed to materialize. The financing statements did not indicate that Bangor
was considering the sale of the BAR or that an offer to purchase the railroad for 5 million
had been received. See 430 U.S. at 8. The plaintiff asserted that the misstated Bangor Punta
prospectus induced him not to accept Chris-Craft's August 4 exchange offer. 561 F.2d at 431.
992 561 F.2d at 431.
"' N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 203(f) (McKinney 1972) states that:
[w]here the time within which an action must be commenced is computed from
the time when facts are discovered or from the time when facts could with reasona-
ble diligence have been discovered, ... , the action must be commenced within two
years after such actual or imputed discovery or within the period otherwise pro-
vided, computed from the time the cause of action accrued, whichever is longer.
Id. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 213(9) (McKinney 1972) provides that an action bassed on fraud
must be commenced within six years.
" 561 F.2d at 432.
"15 See, Sack v. Law, 478 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1973); Barninger v. National Maritime Union,
372 F. Supp. 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Practice Commentary C 203:12 7B McKNNEY's CONSOL-
DATED LAWS 125-127 (1976).
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Craft tender offer expires.' 6 The court, however, held that the plaintiff was
deprived of his right to accurate corporate information' 7 on July 18, 1969
the day Bangor Punta issued its misleading prospectus.'9 8 Since the law
suit was not filed until August 1, 1975, the suit was barred by the six year
statute of limitations."'
The Stull decision illustrates a critical development in the field of
securities litigation. Significantly, the Stull court refused to accept the
argument that the cause of action did not accrue until Chris-Craft's final
tender offer had expired on August 4, 1969. More importantly, the ap-
proach taken by the Stull court exemplifies the way that cases involving
a state statute of limitations and a federal securities violation will be
handled after Chris-Craft.2 11 Courts dealing with these state statutes
likely will choose the limitation period which will reduce the number of
,"I Id. The plaintiff, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in American Pipe & Constr.
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), also argued that the six year statute of limitations was tolled
for a two year period during which a related class action was pending. The court held in
American Pipe that where class action status had been denied solely because of failure to
demonstrate that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractible, the
commencement of the original suit tolls the running of the statute of limitations for all
purported members of the class who make time motions to intervene after class status has
been denied. Id. at 552-53. The Stull court dismissed plaintiffs claim by ruling that the
standard in American Pipe was intended solely for the benefit of purported members of a class
who sought to intervene in an action after class status was denied. 561 F.2d at 433; see Stull
v. Pool, 63 F.R.D. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Stull plaintiff's wife commenced class action on a
complaint similar to the one in Stull).
1" 561 F.2d at 432; see Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (Williams
Act insures that public shareholders confronted by tender offers are not required to respond
without adequate information regarding qualifications and intentions of offering party).
" 561 F.2d at 432. The court reasoned that the plaintiff sustained damage on July 18,
1969 because of the depressing effect that the Bangor Punta overevaluation would have on
the market value of Piper stock. Id. at 433.
"7 See text accompanying notes 196-198 supra.
Any need for a court to choose between a narrow and a broad approach could be
eliminated by the enactment of a federal uniform statute of limitations for violations of the
antifraud provisions of the securities acts. See Bateman & Keith, Statutes of Limitations
Applicable to Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5: Complexity in Need of Reform, 39 Mo.
L. REv. 165 (1974); Jacobs, Affirmative Defenses to Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5
Action, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 857 (1976); Comment, Statutes of Limitations in 10b-5 Actions:
A Proposal For Congressional Legislation, 24 SYRACUSE L. Rxv. 1154 (1973). If such a federal
statute existed, a plaintiff merely would have to allege that a violation of an antifraud statute
had occurred and that plaintiff's claim was filed within the limitation period. Comment,
Statutes of Limitations in l0b-5 Actions: A Proposal For Congressional Legislation, 24
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1154, 1164 (1973). One authority has suggested that the New York statute
discussed in Stull should serve as a model for the federal standard because of the flexibility
the New York statute provides. Id. at 1168-69. Furthermore, the American Law Institute has
developed a Federal Securities Code which contains a statute of limitations provision. Section
1421(c) of the Securities Code provides that no private action may be brought for a securities
provision violation
(1) more than two years after discovery of the underlying facts, except that the
period is tolled while a plaintiff (in the exercise of reasonable care) remains in
ignorance of the facts, or (2) more than four years after the actions accrued. FEDERAL
SEcurrms CODE (Tent. Draft No. 2) § 1421(c) (1973).
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plaintiffs who can validly bring their claims in federal courts.
Stull and Crane demonstrate the restrictions being placed on tender
offer litigation in the federal courts. The Supreme Court in Chris-Craft
initiated this trend by holding that a defeated tender offeror has no private
right of action for damages under the Williams Act.20 ' The Crane III court
applied the Chris-Craft rationale to the rest of the antifraud provisions of
the '34 Act.20 2 Finally, the Stull court, in a suit brought by sharehold-
ers-the protected class under federal securities laws-opted for a short
statutory period of limitations, thereby effectively limiting the number of
shareholder actions that may arise.2°3 The result of this restrictive federal
trend 2 1 may be the emergence of proxy solicitations as the principal means
of corporate acquisition.0 5 A second possible result-is that tender offer
litigation might increasingly become the function of state courts operating
under state takeover provisions.2 6 In either event, after the decisions of
Chris-Craft, Crane and Stull, the tender offer claimant, whether offeror,
target management or shareholder, will no longer find federal courts the
accessible forum they once were.
JOHN F. MURPHY
21 See text accompanying notes 134 and 135 supra. As recently as January, 1977, the
standing of every party to a tender offer to bring suit under the Williams Act was virtually
unquestioned. Offerors, targets, competing offerors, and tendering and non-tendering share-
holders had been held to have standing to sue for both injunctive relief and damages. See
DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 21, at 104. However, the Supreme Court decision
in Chris-Craft eliminated the right of defeated tender offerors to sue for damages and will
have profound implications for future tender offer litigations. Id. at xviii (remarks of Sen.
Williams).
See text accompanying note 155 supra.
N The short statutory period of limitations may present the private shareholder with an
almost insurmountable obstacle. Very few private shareholders will have the time or resources
necessary to uncover corporate fraud within a limited period of time.
201 Restrictions on federal actions by tender offer contestants is consistent with the ra-
tionale of a series of Supreme Court cases which limit the rights of plaintiffs to use a federal
forum to bring suits involving the violation of securities regulations. See, e.g., TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976);
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
Egan, Will Proxy Fights Replace Tender Offer Bids?, Wash. Post, March 16, 1978,
section C at 1, col. 1.
During the last several years, the regulation of tender offers by' state statutes and state
securities commissions has increased greatly. As of July 1, 1977, thirty states had adopted
statutes governing both procedural and substantive aspects of tender offers. See
DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 21 at 207. The possibility of the state becoming
the major forum for tender offer litigation may center on a future Supreme Court ruling as
to the constitutionality of state takeover provisions. See Great Western United Corporation
v. Kidwell discussion section B supra.
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